tical products. Documentation of internal or external audits has to be reported to regulatory bodies. Hemovigilance reports are published by the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut (PEI), reporting statistics of major transfusion reactions as well as blood product donation, use, and discard [3] . Bedside confirmation of recipient's identity and ABO blood group is undertaken prior to red cell transfusion. Bedside testing (BST) is obligatory in Germany for the administrating physician. Such confirmation testing for blood groups ABO and ABO+D is also used in a few other European countries. It confirms patient identity at the bedside immediately before a blood transfusion is started. In addition, BST is intended to confirm the recipient's ABO blood group antigens (of lesser vital importance D) previously determined and thus ensures that there is a match between the recipient's blood group and the blood product. Dependent on the producer of the little test cards, anti-serums for A and B (D) are either to be mixed with the drop of patient's blood (SERAFOL) or are in a liquid compartment where the blood must be injected into (MEDTRO). Agglutination of the red cells with the anti-serum becomes visible and should match the blood group of the blood product to be given. This identifies any incompatibility that may occur if the patient or the blood product had been confused.
Transfusion safety in Germany is believed to be sufficiently robust at state-of-the-art level. Underreporting of safety issues in Germany is not a major concern. Whereas fatal errors resulting in acute hemolytic transfusion reactions are documented in the PEI hemovigilance registry (ranging from 1 to 3 per million in recent years), an underreporting of incorrect allocation of products (risk of incorrectly transfused blood components 0.2 per million) must be assumed. In absence of hard data, incidences of non-fatal errors in the German system were estimated between 1: 32,000 [4] and 1: 36,000 [5] , whereas data from the USA reported higher figures in the range from 1: 12,000 to 1: 19,000 [6] .
To challenge and improve the blood transfusion safety standard in Germany, a dedicated critical incident reporting system (CIRS) for Germany was set up on a voluntary basis in 2009 [7] as a joint venture of the German Interdisciplinary Task Force for Clinical Hemotherapy (IAKH) [8] and the German Interdisciplinary Society of Critical Care and Emergency Medicine (DIVI). Free of charge and accessible for the public, error reporting in the IAKH error registry [9, 10] is encouraged for every user of autologous and allogeneic blood in every health care institution in Germany. As opposed to the PEI registry, any kind of error or critical incident associated with the administration of blood and coagulation products voluntarily can be reported by physicians and other medical staff. Reports were analyzed and categorized by an interdisciplinary committee of transfusion medicine specialists, internists, surgeons, and anesthesiologists. Critical incidents referring to transfusion issues from the German Anesthesiology Societies (DGAI and BDA) CIRS-AINS medical [11] were also surveyed on behalf of the BDA by the IAKH committee and included in the IAKH error registry database.
This article addresses the character of reported errors and critical incidents within the administration process of blood products after a 5-year period. Errors in blood product administration were analyzed for circumstances, relevance, risk of damage, and contributing factors. The publication of committee's recommendations may be of common interest for other than the reporting institutions -therefore, they are listed and grouped as proposed strategies of quality improvement.
Material and Methods

Database and Reporting Form
In 2009, the website went online, and the reporting was encouraged by information in the national medical press [7, 10] . In parallel, the German BDA started an anesthesia-based critical incident reporting system. All incidents concerning a blood product were sent to the IKAH committee for analysis and entry in the IAKH database. The multidisciplinary IAKH committee is constituted of experts from various clinical departments. All aspects of an error report were addressed by the respective specialist either in the committee's session or by requiring re-submittal after analysis.
To avoid a double entry of the same incident, each report is anonymized by coding the individual case with the third letter as well as the number of letters of the first and surname of the patient. The first letter of the area code of the reporting institution had to be given. In each type of entry form, general information such as the American Society of Anesthesiologists risk class (ASA) stratification of the patient according to the perioperative system by the American Society of Anesthesiologists, the location where the incident happened, and which profession detected the error is to be entered. The free accessible web page of error reporting initially had 5 entry forms to report a critical incident categorized by the process steps: 1) blood product order for each incident that happens before, after, or while ordering a blood product from the blood bank or depot including the assessment of the need of transfusion; 2) blood group sample withdrawal and tube labeling for each incident that happens before, after, or while blood withdrawal for type and screen, labeling and sending to the immunology laboratory; 3) laboratory handling of blood probes, type and screen, or release of ordered blood for all incidents in the laboratory, blood bank and depot from arrival of a blood probe until release of a blood or coagulation product to the user or transport system; 4) transport and handling of blood products for incidents happening while and associated to transport and storage of blood products, 5) blood product administration for all incidents happening immediately before, while, or after administration of the blood product to the recipient, identification of the patient, performance of BST, starting of the transfusion and documentation, 6) for other incidents such as coagulation management, autologous processing, or donation. The last form was introduced later and went active in January 2013. The shorter collection period of this type of error is considered in the analysis. All minor process steps covered by the 6 forms are given in table 1. Definition of errors and their categories are listed in table 2 .
Analyses, Definitions, and Categories
In addition, during the work process with the registry, a frequent error located before the process chain even starts was recognized by the committeethe indication to transfuse frequently was not in congruence with the existing guidelines. Without creating a special entry form for that, the correctness of the transfusion indication was tested. The same applied for the patient identification and confusion error. This critical step occurs several times in the administration process -prior to type and screen, blood withdrawal, or blood product administration. The information about a correct or incorrect performance of the BST is required by the IAKH report form. The classification of an error into one or more process steps was done by the committee even if the incident was classified differently by the reporter in accordance to the given categorization of errors (table 2) .
The incoming reports were edited and discussed among committee members in a secured phone conference weekly. Reports and categories of errors were entered in a database. Results are given in absolute counts or errors in the reported cases as well as in percentage of the 5 year's sum of all errors reported. Errors in categorizes and definition for the incidents. Near misses are not distinguished from real errors except when noted. ID-= Identity check; IT = information technology, KIS = hospital information system; POCT = point of care testing; TACO = transfusion associated circulatory overload. In an attempt to confirm the relevance of the critical incident to the reader, the expert group tried to estimate the frequency of the event in German practice with the help of published case reports and personal experience of committee members. Termed as 'frequency estimate', the estimated frequency of an error was classified according to the rate of serious adverse events of pharmaceutical drugs in approval studies as follows: extremely rare -1: 100,000, rare -1: 10,000, medium -1: 1,000, occasional -1: 100, frequent -1: 10. In a further attempt to categorize the potential risk for the recipient's integrity, which is also termed 'damage potency', the committee filed the error case in 5 damage groups from death risk to minor disabilities, similar to the serious adverse event grading in pharmaceutical approval studies: 1) no permanent or transient damage, 2) minor and/or weak transient damage, 3) minor and/or weak transient damage or light permanent disability, 4) considerable acute and/or considerable permanent disability, 5) death or permanent disability.
To assess the association between an erroneous blood administration process to the severity of pre-existing diseases, ASA physical statuses (perioperative risk stratification by the American Society of Anesthesiologists) were included in our analysis.
The committee edited and published each case on the IAKH website (www. iakh.de) together with recommendations to avoid the error both by changes in the process organization of the reporting institution and by changes of the institutional structure. The structure quality comprises the use of other or modern equipment, the increase in personnel, the use of computer technology, the change of existing equipment by the manufacturer, or a change of existing laws and guidelines by the respective authorities. Expert risk minimization recommendations were made based on a committee discussion where the potency for hindrance is either logic, self-explanatory, or based on the experience and knowledge of the experts.
Results
During the 5-year period since the start in 2009, 138 cases were reported via IAKH and CIRS-AINS. More than half of cases (55.9%) originated from the IAKH registry ( fig. 1 ). The webpagebased anonymous entry of an incident is followed by a detailed assessment of the causes and an error analysis.
In more than as half of the reports (52.7%), multiple errors in the application process could be identified. One report case contained 2.16 ± 1.6 errors (mean ± SD). Categories, numbers, and rates of reported errors are listed in table 3.
For all entries, the erroneous process step within the administration process was located ( fig. 2) . Thus, 5.3% of incidents occurred in steps beyond our predefined process steps, such as reports addressing surgical procedure and techniques, pre-donation, or blood product processing. In addition, in 135 cases, the functional unit in the medical institution could be located, i.e. the place where the error initiated ( fig. 3 ). Most critical incidents occurred in operating rooms (OR) (34.1%), intensive care units (ICU) (25.2%) and peripheral wards (18.5%), and to a more minor degree in the laboratory (8.9%), emergency admission unit (5.9%), private practice office (1.5%) and others (e.g. recovery room of the blood donation unit 5.9%).
Both, near misses and true mismatches were reported in our critical incident reporting system. As true errors, we categorized the actual transfusion of wrong blood to the right recipient or vice versa. Whenever the blood product was administered to the patient, the error qualified for a true error instead of a near miss. Thus, transfusion of compatible but confused blood to a recipient was not categorized as near miss. Near misses were all detected errors where, as a consequence, no administration of the blood prod- 2 . Error location within the administration process chain. Errors were located in various steps of the blood product donation process. Process steps: 1) blood product order; 2) blood group sample withdrawal and tube labeling; 3) laboratory handling of blood probes, screen and type, release of ordered blood; 4) transport and handling of blood products, 5) blood product administration, 6) patient identification, 7) others such as coagulation management, autologous processing, or donation (see table 1 for comparison). The administration process itself was by far the most frequent source of errors. uct to the patient had been occurred. For mismatch of recipient and blood product (wrong blood for right patient or wrong patient for wrong blood, near misses (46%) and true errors (53%) are given as absolute numbers in detail (table 4) . Identification of concerned blood products was possible in all cases. Blood type testing errors were assigned to red cell transfusion only. The administration error applied in 63% to packed red cells, in 17% to coagulation concentrates (eventually more if the reporting form for coagulation mismanagement would be active from the start in 2009, but this was set up in 2013), and in 11.6% to autologous products (pre-donation and cell salvage). Fresh frozen plasma and platelets played a minor role (3.9% and 3.1%, respectively) ( fig. 4) .
ASA classification of (intended) recipients was ASA III (46.3%) and IV (23.2%); minor groups were ASA II (17.1%), V (8.5%). and I (4.9%) ( fig. 5 ). Total sum 298 100 ID = Identity check; IT = information technology; KIS = hospital information system; POCT = point of care testing; TACO = transfusion associated circulatory overload. Estimated frequency of critical incidents was 1: 10,000 (21%), 1: 1,000 (43%), and 1: 100 (25%) (fig. 6 ). Potential damage was mostly death or permanent disability in 58% of reports, considerable acute damage or considerable permanent disability in 25%, and minor and/or weak transient damage or light permanent disability in 13% ( fig. 6 ).
Process Quality
Critical incidents occurred in 35.5% of reported cases in a routine situation (35.5%), in 14% in emergency situations, and in 21% during irregular work hours at nighttime or weekends ( fig. 7) . Staff involved in education or only temporary at work was associated to the error in 10.2%. Miscommunication or incomplete information 
(54)
Near misses total (%)
(4.2)
Report IDs for mismatches of blood product and recipients. Counted is the number of errors as opposed the number of mismatched patients or blood products: The number of subjects concerned with this problem is different from the number of errors, i.e. one mismatch concerns frequently a second patient. Percentage given is the rate of all incidents (see table 3 ). 5 . ASA classification concerned. Incidents occurred in transfusion processes for all -from healthy to severely ill recipients (indicated by ASA physical status classification system), with a clear majority in ASA 3 (by definition patients with a severe systemic disease) and in ASA 4 (severe systemic disease that is a constant threat to life). Since the information of the ASA status is not obligatory in the report forms, 41 cases were not reported. transfer as a major source of errors could be identified in 19.4%. However, communication errors among patients, health care personnel (physicians, nurses, ambulance drivers) and institutions (laboratory, wards, ICU, emergency department, OR) were an associated factor that played a role in the development of the incident in 55% of reported cases. Also the erroneous transmission of wrong or incomplete datasets of patients, blood orders, or blood products was defined as communication error. Only in 2 cases, the incidents were caused by acts of negligence. In total, team conflicts were obvious in 4 cases. Indication of administration of blood products frequently was not in congruence with the existing cross-sectional guidelines for the use of blood and blood products as set by the German Medical Association [9] . It was correct in 29.0% but incorrect in 36.2%; for the rest of reports (34.8%), there were no indication if the given guidelines were followed or not.
Confusions and mismatches as well as wrong dosages of blood products occurred in almost half of all reports (67 times in 138 reports, 48.6%) (fig. 8) . Of all mismatches, blood product confusion contributed to 18.8%, patient confusion to 8.7%, and probe mismatch to 7.3%. Wrong doses of blood or coagulation factors were applied in 13.8%. Communication / compatibility of PDMS, laboratory and blood banking software (e.g. for plausibility check, also for documentation of a single patient history for all disciplines within the institution, match of type and screen with selected product, warning sign for drug orders and decreased liver or kidney function, documentation of type and screen test result, actual match of estimated blood loss with actual blood loss calculated from hemoglobin content) 48 
15.05
IT control of electronic blood product and coagulation product order, feedback of blood product availability in storage, automated blood product order for blood loss surgery, indication check and match with guidelines, 27 8.46 Change of laws and guidelines (erase blood group from autologous blood**; introduce obligatory user license for hemotherapy and cell salvage etc.) 6 (3, 3 see details in brackets left)
1.88
Delta-check of laboratory values 8 2.51
Separate delivery and storage of various blood autologous and allogeneic products for same recipient, separation of same products for multiple recipients 6 (4, 2 see details in brackets left)
Information chip about blood group, antibodies, coagulation disorder, or organ malfunction on electronic insurance card or in electronic data base 13 
4.08
Improve blood product transport (temperature preservation and control) 4 1.25
Improve only transfusion documentation software (1 product for 2 subjects/kids) 1 0.31
Ensure information access about hemotherapy guidelines via intranet, handheld, etc. 1 0.31
Use electronic warnings or alert signs (other than for mismatches of KIS and laboratory / blood banking data: i.e., for organ malfunction on electronic chart; obligatory WHO checklist for or admission or or management software with alert warning function, in PDMS for discontinuation of coagulation drugs, …) 8 2.51 *Clinical pathways (CP) were considered structure quality. As opposed to a standard operating procedure or algorithm, CP requires special structures and personnel dedicated to the CP. **The deletion of the labeled blood group from autologous units has several advantages: 1-the match has to be by identity or signature instead of a universal blood group that fits many; 2-the autologous product is issued and labeled very different from allogeneic products. It works perfectly for cell saver blood and might improve administration safety for PAD blood, too. ID = Identification document; GFR = glomerular filtration rate; KIS = hospital information system, PDMS = patient data management system; OR = operation room; ICU = intensive care unit; POCT = point of care testing; WHO = World Health Organization. Recipient's identity match to the blood group detected by obligatory BST (mostly done only for ABO without D) was tested with respect to its capability to avoid the incident reported or to detect a mismatch of either patient or blood unit. Such kind of errors were detected by BST in only 1.8%. BST was unable to avoid the reported mismatch in 29.7% or would have detected the confusion in 13.8%. BST was effective to avoid the confusion of a patient, blood sample, or product in 2.6% and would be suitable to detect it in 5.8%. However, it failed to avoid 66% of the incidents that have occurred. BST was performed in 96% of all reported administrations. It was done or interpreted wrongly in 4 of 142 cases. In 2 cases, the correct result did not come to the attention of the administrator, and once the BST was taken from the wrong patient. In 4 cases of identical ABO blood types, the BST was done but was unable to detect the error.
Administration process performance might be improved by detailed task descriptions ('How is the task to be done in that institution, step by step?') and standard operating procedures (SOPs) available for the field of hemotherapy. The committee gave 479 (3.7 ± 0.6 per report) recommendations to improve administration process quality in total. Among those were 151 (1.27 ± 0.5 per report) collective staff educational measures such as round tables, team coaching, lectures or clinic information events on a specific topic per report, and simulation training. Moreover, to create a permanent change, 214 (1.74 ± 0.5 per report) recommendations targeted to the establishment of a SOP, a written task description, or an algorithm. The measure to bring the report to the knowledge of the institutional transfusion committee was recommended in almost every case (and excluded from the listed recommendations in table 5).
Structure Quality
Secondary to procedural aspects, safety of blood product administration processes is also dependent on the structure of the institution. Resources that may play a role are understaffing, equipment deficiency, and technical outdated data management. The latter has a potential to control the administration process if used as an obligatory measure. The committee addressed administration-associated structure 319 (2.6 ± 0.7 per incident) times. An IT solution (almost exclusively software replacement) had most likely avoided the critical incident 189 times (1.6 ± 0.4 per report).
Discussion
In summary, during the first 5 years of the registry, two error reports per month had been registered and discussed by the expert committee. This analysis predominantly aimed at the nature of the incidents, and not at the number . Obviously, the results of this 5-year review of a national CIRS specialized in hemotherapy must be interpreted very cautiously. In contrast to the voluntary hemovigilance study in the UK (SHOT -Serious Hazards of Transfusion Hemovigilance System) [12] which includes all participating health institutions in the UK, the IAKH voluntary web-based error registry cannot be used as a solid hemovigilance system. On the other hand, the German hemovigilance database of the PEI is not capable of giving information about non-fatal incidents as only transmission of infections, immunological transfusion reactions and transfusion-related acute lung injuries (TRALIs) have to be reported. There was no obligation until 2012 to report confusions or mismatches of blood products if they did not result in a lethal incompatibility reaction. Due to the lack of an obligation to report a critical incident to the IAKH error registry, the registry cannot be used to detect the absolute number of transfusion errors in Germany. Frequency estimates ( fig. 6) given by the committee aim to demonstrate whether or not the reported incident is clinically relevant. To evaluate the benefit of these recommendations, further evaluations would be needed, e.g. comparison of the numbers of incorrectly labeled blood samples or comparison of patient misidentification before and after the implementation of risk minimization measures. However, a scientifically sound interpretation of the expert recommendation's efficacy is difficult and therefore remains speculative.
It is possible to evaluate cofactors such as disease severity or complexity of treatment given (e.g., ASA physical status ( fig. 5 ), emergency transfusion, night call or untrained staff ( fig. 7) ) using the IAKH error registry, and the data obtained resembles those of administration statistics of blood products in Europe in general (for ASA status see [13] ). However, two-thirds of errors happened during routine work hours and under regular conditions. This underlines the significance of improving routine administration since work processes under regular conditions can be better controlled and standardized.
Coagulation management-associated errors might be more important as reflected by our results since the special entry form to report such an error was added later. Furthermore, recommendations of experts for risk minimization cannot be considered valid tools to avoid such transfusion errors. However, any tool to improve patient safety is based on the exchange of methods and measures to avoid risks.
What can be concluded, however, is that the frequency and the variety of errors when administrating blood or blood products are much higher than with other drugs [14] . It appears that product safety is by far superior to administration safety. Moreover, it becomes obvious that all possible errors can actually occur every time and for every aspect of the transfusion process as was previously suspected. This circumstance is worrying for both recipients and physicians and thwarts the sense of a possibly false security generated by the presence of the strict German transfusion law with updated evidence based cross-sectional guidelines for the use of blood and blood products [9] . The question arises if administration safety can be guaranteed by laws, guidelines, code of conduct rules, obligatory reports to PEI every year, and the obligation for physicians to act in a prudent manner. The implementation of guidelines is delayed and incomplete [15] , and the resistance to change daily practice should not be underestimated. Moreover, such an implementation is influenced by various interests at many different levels [16] . However, the knowledge of the frequency and variety of errors might contribute to overcome current implementation barriers. In this respect, the results of this analysis are of general interest. In addition, the knowledge what causes an error might be used to develop strategies to avoid it. It is the opinion of the committee that a considerable part of the reported errors could be eliminated by changes of administration or IT solutions and eventually the implementation of strict SOPs (see three case reports and the respective recommendation for avoidance in the Amendment at http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?doi= 453320). Although the latter approach might be less effective in emergency situations, it should be kept in mind that the majority of reported incidents occurred in a routine situation, and, due to their compact and short form, the adherence to SOPs might be higher than that to laws or detailed guidelines [16] . However, even after implementation of SOPs the need for continued education of all faculty members remains. According to a recent prospective study, the 'training methods varied with most perceived to have minimal effectiveness' [17] . In this respect it is worth mentioning that almost 500 committee recommendations for 138 incidents (3.7 per incident) address improvements of education and process quality.
Another aspect of this analysis was to evaluate whether or not common techniques assumed to be crucial and effective, e.g., BSTare effective in avoiding transfusion errors. According to the results of the IAKH registry, BST was able to avoid the mismatch in only 2.6%. Most errors reported (66%) were unaffected by the BST although major incompatibility transfusion is still possible. Greinacher [4] retrospectively determined 50% of confusions occurring between BST and transfusion (16 of 32 cases). Thus there is reasonable suspicion that BST is overestimated in its efficacy to avoid confusions. BST fails if the probe for cross-match is flawlessly taken not from the recipient but from another person, if the recipient's identity is falsified but has the same blood group as the ID holder, if the BST is not done or misinterpreted, or if the match of blood groups and paperwork is done correctly but the transfusion started to an untested wrong recipient. This demonstrates that BST does not or only very marginally obviate handling errors such as a flawless comparison of ABO bedside results with all documents completed as well as with the products ready for transfusion. Moreover, it addresses only part of all administration safety issues. Based on this error analysis, the question arises if BST is worth the minimal cost as in most of the error reports it was ineffective as 66% of incidents were unchanged by the test result. In those reports concerned, the test was misinterpreted, was not done, the recipient was confused after performance of the test, or the wrong blood product was used for the test. The knowledge of the limitations of the BST should be kept in mind by administrators of red blood cells in Germany.
Technical solutions in general might be more effective since they both can lead the user through guideline-compliant administration of blood products and control the administration process [18] . Special IT-based safety features are proposed to erase user errors, e.g., the use of bar codes [19] and radiofrequency identification (RFID) tracking systems [20] [21] [22] from blood sampling to transfusion [23] . Using a computerized administration guide, the documentation of drug and blood administration can be improved.
In a lot of German institutions blood product order via phone or paper forms is still active, not allowing a plausibility check and the data match to the patient's chart information and laboratory results. When considering the technical equipment of German hospitals, improvement of IT-based measures might a very promising approach to increase hemovigilance in Germany. However, current publications emphasize the potential of an end-to-end-control of blood product administration since SHOT lessons teach us that 'the main risks remain human factors' [12] . The suggestions by the IAKH committee comprised procedures -to mention only the most frequent recommendations -such as the delta check method of the laboratory software to detect implausible laboratory values or the compatibility of blood banking software with the institutional patient data management system (PDMS). Procedures and
techniques not yet applied in Germany rarely were suggested by the committee, e.g. a central registry for patients with multiple antibodies (twice in table 4) as already recommended by Delaney and coauthors [24] .
The most frequent suggestion (15% of all recommendations) of the expert committee was to establish compatible IT system for blood banking and PDMS. In the opinion of the committee, this change inherits the potential to avoid transfusion errors in multiple cases. On the other hand, it depicts a major problem in the IT structure of German transfusion medicine -the majority of blood banking software systems is incompatible with the PDMS of the treatment facilities. As a consequence, double data entry and double input errors occur, and information transfer and plausibility checks are missed. User errors remain undetected. The safety improvement with the implementation of compatible systems seems to be underestimated. The Eurocode International Blood Labeling System provides a quick solution. To date, the unique product ID, product type, and blood group are encoded eye-readable and in three linear barcodes at the product label but in the near future, the Eurocode system will provide a threefold match in one two-dimensional barcode format. The computer-generated match of data matrix and thus blood product information can easily be read in the PDMS by scanner cameras [25] .
In addition, other IT-associated measures that more or less are based on the data management systems already in use were recommended, such as the electronic order of blood products [26] and identification checks [27, 28] .
However, the question remains whether or not IT solutions will be able to increase the safety and performance in real practice. Current attempts to improve user performance by directing administration procesess and decision steps via computed guidance can be bypassed in some instances [29] . So it is questionable if a computer-guided order entry can be designed for better performance. Liberal practice is also reported elsewhere [30] [31] [32] . Therefore, the recommendation to establish an electronic order system is based on many theoretical but yet unproven advantages, such as adherence to guidelines, plausibility checks, data control, documentation, and storage-associated issues such as procurement. However, first attempts in Stanford, CA, and Minneapolis, MN, to install clinical decision support were promising [33] [34] [35] [36] .
Among the IT solutions most frequently suggested by the committee (listed in table 1) was the scanner-based guided identification match from patient [37, 38] , blood sample [39, 40] , and blood products -the 'vein-to-vein' IT system. Its importance and potential benefit has only recently been proven [22, 41] . Mismatches in 1% of transfusion processes could be avoided by using a scannerbased system [19] , although its implementation is not free of complications [42] . Even though this system or parts of it are tested by several institutions, only a few experienced users worldwide currently are using it today [43, 44] . Furthermore, its implementation is often restrained by the national data protection guidelines/laws. The present report, however, demonstrates the urgency to use and further develop those systems [27, 43, [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] in order to markedly improve patient safety in spite of unsolved data safety issues. Encoding techniques still could be added and improved in the second implementation phase, but the benefit of a scanner-based system seems to be beyond question when considering the variety of incidents summarized in this report. Whether or not the technical refinement of vein-to-vein IT systems should be awaited before implementation is a matter of controversial debate. However, a number of problems are still unsolved, e.g., the choice of frequency and interference effects when applying RFID technology [22, [53] [54] [55] . Lastly, when considering the German hemovigilance report [3] , it becomes obvious that administration safety is not well reported in Germany. The relation of In the IAKH registry, the erroneous administration of the wrong blood product to the wrong patient was reported as 'near misses' 14 times (nearly 10% of reports) even though the product had actually been administered. The actual rate of nationwide confusions is not known but clearly is much higher than the reported deaths due to transfusion errors. The ABO incompatibility frequency in Germany resulting in serious transfusion reactions amounts to 6.8% of all reported serious transfusion reactions per year (data from 1999 until 2009 [56] ). To restrict the safety of blood administration onto fatalities might arouse patient safety concerns -especially when technical solutions to the problem are available and inexpensive, at least when compared to further reduction of infection transmission rates.
In summary, the analysis of errors occurring in the German transfusion system showed that BST covered only a minority of handling errors, that the adherence to the extensive German transfusion guidelines (particularly with regard to transfusion needs) is low, and that, according to the expert recommendations for practice improvement, transfusion safety might be improved by technical solutions such as barcode-or RFID-based scanner techniques. 
Amendment
See supplemental material at http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/ produkte.asp?doi=453320.
